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INTRODUCTION 
On September 28, 2011, after thirty-three years on death row, Manuel 
Valle, age sixty-one, was executed by the State of Florida.1 In 1987, Valle 
shot and killed police officer Louis Pena during a routine traffic stop.2 At 
the time, Valle was twenty-seven years old.3  
Why did it take Florida over three decades to execute Manuel Valle? 
During the first thirteen years after Pena’s murder, Florida prosecutors 
struggled to obtain a constitutionally sound conviction and sentence. The 
Florida Supreme Court reversed Valle’s initial conviction and sentence 
because the trial court forced him to stand trial within twenty-four days of 
his arraignment, in violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel.4 
On retrial, Valle was again sentenced to death, but this second sentence was 
vacated because the trial court improperly excluded mitigating testimony.5 
The Florida Supreme Court upheld Valle’s third death sentence on appeal 
in 1991, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.6 For 
the next twenty years, however, Valle continued to litigate from death row. 
He filed a motion for state postconviction relief and federal petitions for a 
writ of habeas corpus, all of which were denied.7  
 
1 See Adam Liptak, Lifelong Death Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, at A16 (discussing 
Valle’s crime and the delay prior to his execution); see also Patricia Mazzei, Florida Executes Cop 
Killer Manuel Valle, 61, by Lethal Injection, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.tampabay. 
com/news/publicsafety/crime/article1194149.ece (describing Valle’s final moments). 
2 See Valle v. State, 474 So. 2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1985) (describing the testimony of a police 
officer who witnessed the murder and testified that he saw Valle approach Officer Pena and fire a 
single shot at him), vacated, 476 U.S. 1102 (1986); see also Patricia Mazzei, Manuel Valle to Be 
Executed Wednesday for Killing Officer Louis Pena, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www. 
tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/article1193954.ece (“Pena was about to let Valle go when 
Valle, standing next to the patrol car, asked if he could walk back to [his] Camaro to get a cigarette. 
Pena said yes. Valle returned with a hidden .380-caliber automatic pistol.”). 
3 See Liptak, supra note 1. 
4 Valle v. State, 394 So. 2d 1004, 1005 (Fla. 1981). 
5 See Valle v. Florida, 476 U.S. 1102, 1102 (1986) (vacating Valle’s sentence pursuant to Skipper 
v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986)); Skipper, 476 U.S. at 8 (holding that mitigating testimony 
proffered by disinterested witnesses regarding the defendant’s good behavior in prison could not 
be excluded).  
6 See Valle v. State, 581 So. 2d 40, 49 (Fla.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 986 (1991). 
7 See Initial Brief of Appellant at 5-8, Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-
1387), 2011 WL 3319905 (detailing the procedural history of Valle’s case). After his death sentence 
was upheld, Valle filed a motion for postconviction relief in 1997. Id. at 6. The Florida Supreme 
Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Valle’s assertion that his counsel during his 1988  
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 When Florida Governor Rick Scott signed Valle’s death warrant in 
June 2011,8 Valle sought last-minute relief from the courts. He raised a new 
argument—that execution after such a lengthy delay would violate the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.9 Specifically, 
Valle asserted that his execution was unconstitutional because the State 
“added to [his] death sentence the morbid additional sentence of being 
taunted with death for three decades—the greater part of his life.”10 Ulti-
mately, however, Florida executed Valle by lethal injection after the United 
States Supreme Court refused his petition for stay of execution and writ of 
certiorari.11  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to address the validity of 
the unconstitutional delay claim raised by Valle and other death row 
inmates before him. The issue first came to the Court’s attention over 
fifteen years ago, in Lackey v. Texas.12 Justice Stevens issued a memorandum 
respecting the Court’s denial of certiorari in which he acknowledged that 
although “the importance and novelty of the question . . . are sufficient to 
warrant review by this Court, those factors also provide a principled basis 
for postponing consideration of the issue until after it has been addressed by 
 
resentencing hearing was ineffective for deciding to present model prisoner evidence, which 
allowed for the State, in turn, to produce damaging rebuttal evidence; his claim was eventually 
rejected. See Valle v. State, 778 So. 2d 960, 967 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam). Valle then filed a state 
habeas petition raising four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, which the Florida Supreme 
Court denied in 2002. Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 905, 907, 911 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam). Following 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Valle filed a 
second state habeas petition in 2003, which was also rejected. Valle v. Crosby, 859 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 
2003) (unpublished table opinion). Valle then filed a habeas petition in federal court in 2003, 
raising a total of fourteen different claims, all of which were denied. See Valle v. Crosby, No. 03-
20387, 2005 WL 3273754, at *2, *77 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2005). In 2006, the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the denial of Valle’s federal habeas petition, and the Supreme Court subsequently denied 
certiorari. See Valle v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 459 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 552 U.S. 920 (2007). 
8 See Mark Caputo & David Ovalle, Scott Signs First Death Warrant as Florida Governor, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES ( June 30, 2011), http://www.tampabay.com/incoming/scott-signs-first-death-
warrant-as-florida-governor/1178173; see also Initial Brief of Appellant, supra note 7, at 69 (describ-
ing how “[f]or three years and nine months, the Governor of Florida exercised his standardless 
discretion to decline to sign Mr. Valle’s death warrant,” before changing his mind in June 2011).  
9 See Initial Brief of Appellant, supra note 7, at 9. 
10 Id. at 64-65.  
11 See Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011); Mazzei, supra note 1 (detailing Valle’s final words 
and the moments leading up to his execution). 
12 See 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certio-
rari) (“Petitioner raises the question whether executing a prisoner who has already spent some 17 
years on death row violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.”). 
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other courts.”13 Justice Stevens emphasized that denial of certiorari provided 
an important opportunity for state and lower federal courts to “serve as 
laboratories in which the issue receives further study before it is addressed 
by this Court.”14 Since Lackey, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to 
every petitioner asserting this argument (hereinafter referred to as a “Lackey 
claim”), including Manuel Valle, and thus has not ruled on whether—or 
when—executions after inordinate delays on death row constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
 Several Justices, however, have spoken out both in favor of and against 
recognizing an Eighth Amendment claim based on inordinate delay on 
death row. Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens have long urged the Court to 
address a Lackey claim, which, they suggest, has merit. Indeed, Justice Breyer 
has dissented from every one of the Court’s refusals to grant certiorari to an 
inmate raising a Lackey claim.15 In Valle v. Florida, Breyer noted that he had 
“little doubt about the cruelty of so long a period of incarceration under 
sentence of death” and further observed that three decades of “confinement 
followed by execution would also seem unusual.”16 Similarly, since issuing 
the Lackey memorandum, Justice Stevens has opined that execution after 
decades-long delays on death row is “without constitutional justification.”17 
In contrast, Justice Thomas has repeatedly rejected Lackey claims by 
refuting “the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply 
of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his execution 
is delayed.”18 He has consistently maintained that the Lackey claim lacks a 
basis in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.19 
Despite the considerable amount of time it takes to develop a Lackey 
claim, the issue continues to present itself, particularly as the length of time 
prisoners spend on death row increases. According to a 2010 Bureau of Justice 
Statistics report, from 1984 to 2010, the average elapsed time between 
 
13 Id. at 1045. 
14 Id. at 1047 (quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (opinion of Stevens, J., 
respecting the denial of certiorari)). 
15 See Valle, 132 S. Ct. at 2 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of stay of execution). For a 
discussion of the arguments that Justices Breyer and Stevens have raised in support of the Lackey 
claim, see also infra Section III.A. 
16 132 S. Ct. at 1 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of stay of execution).  
17 Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 544 (2009) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting 
the denial of stay of execution and certiorari).  
18 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).  
19 See id. (asserting that there is no “support in the American constitutional tradition or in 
this Court’s precedent” for the Lackey claim); see also, e.g., Johnson, 130 S. Ct. at 544 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the denial of stay of execution and certiorari) (citing Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 
(Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari)); Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1301 
(2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (quoting Knight, 528 U.S. at 990). 
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sentence and execution for all death row inmates more than doubled, 
increasing from 74 months in 1984 to 178 months in 2010.20 With the Lackey 
issue still unresolved, and with over 3100 people currently on death row in 
the United States,21 courts can anticipate an increasing number of claims 
that execution after inordinate delay on death row violates the Eighth 
Amendment. Therefore, it is time for the Court to confront the issue and 
definitively determine the constitutionality of inordinate death row delays. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of the highest court’s resolution of the 
issue, the Supreme Court is unlikely to take a Lackey case in the near future. 
Since Justice Stevens issued the Lackey memorandum over fifteen years ago, 
procedural roadblocks have emerged that have prevented lower courts from 
addressing the merits of Lackey claims.22 I argue that in certain circumstances, 
execution after lengthy confinement on death row does violate the Eighth 
Amendment and the “evolving standards of decency”23 by which the 
Amendment is measured. Therefore, states must implement workable 
solutions that are carefully calibrated to address both the Lackey claim and 
the countervailing policy considerations. 
Part I of this paper summarizes the bedrock principles that guide the 
Court in analyzing capital sentences challenged on Eighth Amendment 
grounds. Part II describes the substance of the Lackey claim and focuses on 
the causes of delay on death row and the psychological effect of this delay, 
known as the “death row phenomenon.”24 Part III traces the ongoing debate 
over the Lackey claim among the Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court. Then, Part IV assesses the experiment taking place in the “laborato-
ries” of lower state and federal courts, and concludes that it has been 
lackluster, mostly because of the procedural issues that have limited courts’ 
opportunities to address the merits of Lackey claims. Finally, in recognition 
that the Court is unlikely to grant certiorari and rule on the validity of 
Lackey claims, Part V focuses on alternative solutions to the problem of 
inordinate death row delays. 
 
20 See TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2010—STATISTICAL TABLES 12 tbl.8 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp10st.pdf. 
21 See NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH ROW U.S.A. 1 (Fall 2012) 
(stating that, as of October 1, 2012, there were estimated to be 3146 death row inmates in the 
United States).  
22 For a discussion of two of the most common procedural issues encountered when inmates 
raise Lackey claims, see infra Part IV. 
23 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
24 See infra text accompanying note 84. 
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I. THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:  
AN OVERVIEW 
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: “Ex-
cessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 
unusual punishments inflicted.”25 In 1958, the Court observed in Trop v. 
Dulles that “[t]he exact scope of the constitutional phrase ‘cruel and unusual’ 
has not been detailed by this Court.”26 Despite the vague contours of the 
Eighth Amendment, from the time of the Framers until the 1970s, courts 
accepted the death penalty as constitutional.27 
In 1972, however, the longstanding approach to the death penalty began 
to shift. First, in a brief per curiam opinion in Furman v. Georgia, the Court 
declared that that the “imposition and carrying out of the death penalty 
[pursuant to Georgia’s and Texas’s capital punishment statutes] consti-
tute[d] cruel and unusual punishment.”28 Concurring, Justice Brennan 
articulated four principles inherent in the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 
cruel and unusual punishment: first, a punishment must not be “degrading 
to human dignity”; second, it must not be arbitrarily inflicted; third, a 
“punishment must not be unacceptable to contemporary society”; and 
finally, the “punishment must not be excessive.”29 
Although Justices Brennan and Marshall each opined in Furman that the 
death penalty was per se unconstitutional,30 the other concurring opinions 
cited narrower reasons for striking it down. Specifically, several of the Justices 
found that the Georgia statute facilitated this most severe punishment in an 
unconstitutionally arbitrary manner.31 For those Justices, it was not capital 
 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment applies to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).  
26 356 U.S. at 99. 
27 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 177-78 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“For nearly two 
centuries, this Court, repeatedly and often expressly, has recognized that capital punishment is not 
invalid per se.”). The Gregg Court referenced early cases in which the Court had upheld execution 
by public shooting and electrocution. See id. at 178 (citing Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 
(1878), and In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890), respectively). 
28 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (per curiam). Furman consolidated three separate cases, two 
from Georgia and one from Texas. Id. at 239. All nine Justices wrote separate opinions in Furman. 
Id. at 240. Each of the five concurring opinions, written by Justice Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, 
White, or Marshall, was issued by a single Justice with no others joining. Id. at 240-375. 
29 See id. at 270-81 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
30 See id. at 286 (“[D]eath is today a ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment.”); id. at 358-59, 369-71 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding that capital punishment both is excessive and has become 
unacceptable to the American people). 
31 See, e.g., id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“What the legislature may not do for all classes 
uniformly and systematically, a judge or jury may not do for a class that prejudice sets apart from  
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punishment itself that violated the constitution in Furman, but the unpredict-
ability of its imposition under the Georgia statute.32 According to Justice 
Douglas, the law gave sentencers “practically untrammeled discretion to let 
an accused live or insist that he die.”33 Similarly, Justice Stewart concluded 
that because “this unique penalty [was] so wantonly and so freakishly 
imposed,” particularly on minority groups, its use was cruel and unusual.34  
Furman effectively put a halt to the death penalty in the United States 
while legislatures revised their capital punishment statutes to meet the 
newly articulated constitutional requirements.35 Four years later, the Court 
lifted its implied moratorium when it upheld Georgia’s, Florida’s, and 
Texas’s revised sentencing statutes.36 These cases, along with two others 
decided the same day, are referred to as the “July 2 cases.”37 
The July 2 cases outline the basic requirements a capital punishment 
scheme must satisfy to comport with the Constitution. Although the July 2 
cases ended Furman’s effective ban on capital punishment, the four principles 
inherent in the Eighth Amendment, articulated by Justice Brennan in 
Furman, played an important role in the Court’s analysis. In the leading 
July 2 case, Gregg v. Georgia, Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens declared 
that Georgia could constitutionally execute the defendant because its 
revised capital punishment statute remedied the deficiencies identified in 
Furman.38 Rather than providing the jury with unguided discretion, the new 
Georgia law required that the sentencer find and specifically articulate at 
 
the community); id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and 
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people 
convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the 
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death 
has in fact been imposed.” (footnote omitted)). 
32 See Michael P. Connolly, Note, Better Never Than Late: Prolonged Stays on Death Row Violate 
the Eighth Amendment, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 101, 103-04 (1997) 
(arguing that the Court held the death penalty unconstitutional because “there lacked statutory 
guarantees . . . to protect against the arbitrary imposition of the punishment”).  
33 Furman, 408 U.S. at 248 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
34 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
35 Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Constitute 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 152-53 (1998). 
36 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (leading case); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).  
37 See James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing With Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment, 
1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28-37 & nn.119-60 (2007). In the two other July 2 cases, 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), the 
Court invalidated the challenged state laws.  
38 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (plurality opinion) (“No longer can a Georgia jury do as Fur-
man’s jury did: reach a finding of the defendant’s guilt and then, without guidance or direction, 
decide whether he should live or die.”). 
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least one statutory aggravating circumstance to justify imposing the death 
penalty.39 The Georgia statute also mandated that the jury consider during 
sentencing any mitigating circumstances presented by the defense.40 This 
revised statute satisfied the Court because it both limited the types of 
crimes that made an offender eligible for the death penalty and provided 
broad latitude, upon consideration of mitigating evidence, for the sentencer 
to recommend life imprisonment rather than death.41 Thus the imposition 
of the death penalty was consistent with the principle that “the State must 
not arbitrarily inflict a severe punishment.”42 
The Gregg Court was also satisfied that capital punishment was not, to 
use Justice Brennan’s words in his concurrence in Furman, “unacceptable to 
contemporary society.”43 In Trop v. Dulles, the Court had declared that “[t]he 
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency 
that mark the progress of a maturing society.”44 Since then, the Court has 
measured society’s acceptance of a particular punishment based on “objective 
indicators,” such as legislative determinations, jury sentences, public opinion, 
and even international practices.45 In Gregg, the plurality found not only that 
capital punishment was a long-accepted practice in this country, but also 
 
39 Id. at 165-66.  
40 See id. at 164 (explaining that the judge must instruct the jury to consider mitigating cir-
cumstances as well as aggravating circumstances); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 
(1978) (opinion of Burger, C.J.) (“[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from 
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the 
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
41 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-97 (plurality opinion). The plurality in Gregg also highlighted 
the additional safeguard of expedited review by the state supreme court of all death sentences to 
ensure that the punishment was appropriate. Id. at 166.  
Although the statute in Gregg is demonstrative of a constitutionally valid capital punishment 
statute, it is not the only permissible scheme. For example, Texas’s capital sentencing structure, 
upheld by the Court in Jurek, differed from the system upheld in Gregg in that it did not involve 
consideration of statutory aggravating factors. Instead, it required that the jury answer three 
questions affirmatively before the death penalty could be imposed. See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 269 
(plurality opinion) (“If the jury finds that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
answer to each of the three questions is yes, then the death sentence is imposed. If the jury finds 
that the answer to any question is no, then a sentence of life imprisonment results.”).  
42 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 274 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
43 Id. at 277; see Gregg, 248 U.S. at 182 (plurality opinion). 
44 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
45 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (“The beginning point is a review of 
objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that 
have addressed the question.”); cf. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion) (“[A]n assessment of 
contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction is relevant to the applica-
tion of the Eighth Amendment.”);. 
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that “[t]he most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the death 
penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman”—over thirty-five 
states responded to the opinion in Furman not by abolishing the death 
penalty but by revising their statutes to make their schemes constitutional.46 
Another core component of the Eighth Amendment is the mandate that 
the punishment not be excessive.47 To meet this requirement, the sanction 
imposed cannot be disproportionate to the crime. Additionally, “[i]f there is 
a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for 
which the punishment is inflicted, the punishment inflicted is unnecessary 
and therefore excessive.”48 The Court therefore must assess the purposes for 
which the death penalty is inflicted and determine whether this punishment 
serves the goals of deterrence or retribution. As Justice White noted in 
Furman:  
At the moment that [a proposed execution] ceases realistically to further 
these purposes, however, the emerging question is whether its imposition in 
such circumstances would violate the Eighth Amendment. It is my view 
that it would, for its imposition would then be the pointless and needless 
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible social 
or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the State 
would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of 
the Eighth Amendment.49 
In upholding the capital punishment statute in Gregg, the plurality deferred 
to the judgment of Georgia’s legislature that the execution of certain 
offenders did serve these social purposes.50 
 
46 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80 (plurality opinion). 
47 Furman, 408 U.S. at 271-72 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. (noting that this command 
prohibits a punishment from inflicting severe physical or mental suffering, but that “[m]ore than 
the presence of pain, however, is comprehended in the judgment that the extreme severity of a 
punishment makes it degrading to the dignity of human beings”). 
48 Id. at 279 (citations omitted). 
49 Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring). 
50 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e cannot say that the judgment of the 
Georgia Legislature that capital punishment may be necessary in some cases is clearly wrong.”). 
The fourth principle inherent in the Eighth Amendment, according to Justice Brennan, is that 
a punishment not be “degrading to human dignity.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 291. He described this 
purpose as the “primary principle,” id. at 271, “which . . . supplies the essential predicate for the 
application of the others,” id. at 281; see also id. at 286 (“It is a denial of human dignity for the state 
to arbitrarily subject a person to an unusually severe punishment that society has indicated it does 
not regard as acceptable, and that cannot be shown to serve any penal purpose more effectively 
than a significantly less drastic punishment.”). Consideration of this principle therefore takes place 
through consideration of the other three principles. 
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Since these landmark decisions, the Court has continued to further define 
the constitutional limits of the death penalty. One way in which it has done 
so is by categorically banning the execution of certain classes of defendants.51 
In Coker v. Georgia, the Court declared that those convicted only of rape of 
an adult could not be executed,52 and in Enmund v. Florida, the Court 
prohibited the execution of minor participants in felony murder who were 
not present for the killing and who did not “intend[] or contemplate[] that 
life would be taken.”53 And most recently, the Court has declared the 
execution of insane,54 mentally retarded,55 and juvenile offenders56 to be 
cruel and unusual punishment. 
II. THE SUBSTANCE OF A LACKEY CLAIM 
How does a delay in execution fail to meet the Court’s Eighth Amend-
ment standards, particularly given that the procedural safeguards that prolong 
the process are intended to benefit inmates by ensuring that only those 
deserving of execution will face this punishment? Before assessing the 
treatment of Lackey claims over the past fifteen years, I lay out the substan-
tive argument asserted by the prisoners who have spent a good portion of 
their lives on death row. 
A Justice of the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether 
inordinate delays on death row violate the Eighth Amendment when 
Clarence Allen Lackey, who spent seventeen years on death row prior to his 
execution, filed a petition for certiorari in 1995.57 Lackey argued that the 
State of Texas had forfeited the right to execute him as a result of his 
 
51 See Aarons, supra note 35, at 157-60 (explaining how, since the July 2 cases, the Court has 
“revisited the question of whether executing a particular class of defendants is consistent with the 
Eighth Amendment”). 
52 See 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“We have concluded that a sentence of 
death is grossly disproportionate and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore 
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.”).  
53 See 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).  
54 See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986). 
55 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
56 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S 551, 575 (2005). 
57 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995) (No. 94-8262), 
1995 WL 17904041. In a published memorandum, Justice Stevens noted the “importance and 
novelty” of this issue. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., 
respecting the denial of certiorari). However, the argument had been raised by inmates long 
before Lackey. See, e.g., In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172-74 (1890) (discussing a four-week delay on 
death row, but then granting the writ of habeas corpus on grounds that the conviction violated the 
Ex Post Facto Clause); Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960) (rejecting the 
defendant’s argument that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment because of his 
imprisonment on death row for over eleven years). 
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protracted stay on death row.58 He asserted that his execution would be 
cruel and unusual punishment because: (1) imposing the death penalty after 
an inordinate delay on death row would have been unacceptable to the 
Framers;59 (2) execution after such a delay did not comport with “evolving 
standards of decency” and was contrary to international opinion;60 and (3) 
Lackey’s delay on death row resulted in the infliction of unnecessary and 
gratuitous pain in the form of intense psychological suffering.61  
Lackey claims exists because of the numerous delays ingrained in capital 
cases, and which result in the incarceration of prisoners for many years 
before their death sentences are carried out. As previously mentioned, the 
average death row inmate suffers in detention for nearly fifteen years before 
execution.62 Some inmates whose petitions for certiorari have reached the 
Court since Lackey have spent nearly thirty years waiting for death.63 
Beyond the delays that accompany a capital trial, the appellate process is 
fraught with additional interruptions.  
There are common causes for delay in capital appeals. The assembly of a 
complete record for appellate review, the wait for the delivery of an opinion 
by appellate courts, and the further procedures provided by most states for 
inmates to petition for postconviction relief account for much of the delay 
in the appeals process.64 State postconviction relief statutes often provide 
 
58 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 57, at 8 (“This forfeiture has resulted both 
from the inordinate amount of time that Mr. Lackey has spent on Texas’ death row and the States’ 
[sic] unnecessary setting of repeated execution dates in this case.”).  
59 See id. at 18-19 (arguing that “if the Framers considered a punishment cruel and unusual in 
1789, then a fortiori it is cruel and unusual today,” and quoting then-recent Supreme Court case 
law looking to whether, in the Court’s words, his death sentence was one of “those modes or acts 
of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was 
adopted” (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989) (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 405))). 
60 See id. at 20-21. 
61 See id. at 22-23. In addition to making the arguments listed above, inmates raising a Lackey 
claim also typically argue that their execution is cruel and unusual because it “does not further the 
penological goals of deterrence and retribution.” Erin Simmons, Comment, Challenging an 
Execution after Prolonged Confinement on Death Row [Lackey Revisited], 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1249, 1252 (2009).  
62 See SNELL, supra note 20, at 12 tbl.8 (depicting the increase in delays in executions over 
the past several decades). 
63 In addition to Manuel Valle, who was on death row for thirty-three years, the petitioner in 
Thompson v. McNeil for thirty-two years, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting from 
the denial of certiorari); the petitioner in Smith v. Arizona for thirty years, 552 U.S. 985, 985 
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); and the petitioner in Foster v. Florida 
for twenty-seven years, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari).  
64 See Jeremy Root, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A Reconsideration of the Lackey 
Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 294-96 (2001) (noting that state postconviction  
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petitioners with the opportunity to present claims after the direct appeal 
process to a trial and an appellate court, and then to the state supreme 
court.65 In fact, the requirement that a petitioner exhaust his claim in the 
state’s highest court in order to file a petition for federal habeas corpus 
relief is another factor contributing to lengthy delays on death row.66 
Delays are further exacerbated by “the quest for [competent] counsel”67 and 
by other factors such as frivolous filings by the petitioner and the setting of 
execution dates, which have the effect of “catalyz[ing] the litigation process 
into motion.”68  
A Lackey claim’s concern extends beyond the fact of delay—the heart of 
the argument relates to the conditions of confinement on death row that 
inmates endure for so long as a result of the delays described above. Death 
row is characterized by isolation. Justice Stevens highlighted that one 
inmate who unsuccessfully asserted a Lackey claim “endured especially 
severe conditions” by “spending up to 23 hours per day in isolation in a 6-
by 9-foot cell.”69 Although the administration of prisons varies by state, 
conditions are consistently bleak for death row inmates.70 Many spend 
almost all of their time alone in small cells separated from the rest of the 
prison population and leave only for medical reasons, consultation with 
lawyers, media interviews, or limited opportunities to see visitors.71 As one 
justice of the Florida Supreme Court noted, “These facilities and procedures 
were not designed and should not be used to maintain prisoners for years 
and years.”72  
The uncertainty of death that looms over prisoners for years prior to 
execution compounds the problem. Today, a number of death row inmates 
 
procedures vary, with some sending petitions directly to the state’s highest court and others 
providing numerous rounds of review). 
65 See id. at 295-96 (describing different postconviction schemes). 
66 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2006). Federal law provides two exceptions to this requirement: 
for applicants to whom “there is an absence of available State corrective process,” and in circum-
stances where “such process [would be] ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” Id. 
§ 2254(b)(1)(B). 
67 Root, supra note 64, at 294; see id. at 298-99. 
68 Id. at 299-301; see also Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 
46 CASE W. RES. L. REV 1, 10 (1995) (“It should come as no surprise that death penalty cases 
take a long time to work through the system. It takes several minutes just to walk through the 
steps of a streamlined case, without even discussing the many ways in which the process can be 
deliberately prolonged.”). 
69 Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting 
the denial of certiorari).  
70 See infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text. 
71 See Swafford v. State, 679 So. 2d 736, 742 n.8 (Fla. 1996) (Wells, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
72 Id.  
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awaiting execution die instead from natural causes.73 The prospect of 
winning on appeal provides many inmates with a “false sense of hope” that 
they will not be put to death.74 One justice of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court noted that “[l]engthy delays, especially if punctuated by a 
series of last minute reprieves, intensify the prisoner’s suffering.”75 Addi-
tionally, a study of inmates on Florida’s death row—where Valle spent three 
decades of his life—found that 42% of inmates had “seriously considered” 
suicide and 35% had attempted suicide.76 Rather than commit suicide, some 
death row inmates instead have volunteered for execution by waiving 
appeals of their sentence.77 
Unsurprisingly, then, Clarence Lackey described death row as “one of 
the loneliest, most miserable places on the earth.”78 Willie Lloyd Turner, a 
death row inmate who was executed in 1995, described his experience in 
equally bleak terms: 
It’s the unending, uninterrupted immersion in death that wears on you so 
much. It’s the parade of friends and acquaintances who leave for the death 
house and never come back, while your own desperate and lonely time drains 
away. It’s the boring routine of claustrophobic confinement, punctuated by 
eye-opening dates with death that you helplessly hope will be averted.79 
Scholars agree with this depiction of death row. Professor William Schabas 
likened the “horror” of death row to a combination of “a hospital ward for the 
 
73 See SNELL, supra note 20, at 8 tbl.1 & n.a (listing the number of prisoners removed from 
death row in each state in 2009 and 2010 and noting that fifteen death row inmates died of natural 
causes in 2010).  
74 Dan Crocker, Note, Extended Stays: Does Lengthy Imprisonment on Death Row Undermine the 
Goals of Capital Punishment?, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 555, 563 (1998) (describing how appeals 
or temporary stays of execution often lead prisoners to believe that they will not be executed). 
75 Dist. Att’y v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274, 1291 n.5 (Mass. 1980) (Liacos, J., concurring), 
superseded by constitutional amendment, MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXVI, amended by amend. CXVI, 
as recognized in Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984). 
76 Kate McMahon, Dead Man Waiting: Death Row Delays, the Eighth Amendment, and What 
Courts and Legislatures Can Do, 25 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 43, 51-52 (2007). 
77 See State v. Ross, 873 A.2d 131, 133 (Conn. 2005) (finding that the defendant was competent 
and made a “knowing, intelligent and voluntary” waiver of his right to further appeal his death 
sentence); see also McMahon, supra note 76, at 50-55 (describing Ross as a powerful illustration of 
the psychological impact of death row confinement on inmates).  
78 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 57, at 6.  
79 Kathleen M. Flynn, Note, The “Agony of Suspense”: How Protracted Death Row Confinement 
Gives Rise to an Eighth Amendment Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 54 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 291, 296 n.30 (1997) (citation omitted). 
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terminally ill, an institution for the criminally insane, and an ultramaximum 
security wing in a penitentiary.”80  
Many courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have long 
recognized—even before Lackey—that the conditions on death row are at 
best difficult to endure and at worst what the California Supreme Court has 
called “dehumanizing.”81 As far back as 1890 the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged, in reference to just a four-week delay on death row, that the uncer-
tainty of living under a sentence of death is “one of the most horrible 
feelings” a person can experience.82 Eighty years later, the California 
Supreme Court similarly noted that “the process of carrying out a verdict of 
death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to consti-
tute psychological torture.”83 
The mental anguish and psychological torture that takes place while 
awaiting execution is often referred to as the “death row phenomenon” or 
“death row syndrome.”84 This term traces back to Soering v. United Kingdom, 
a case decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 1989.85 In 
Soering, the defendant, who fled to the United Kingdom after committing a 
double murder in Virginia, argued that his extradition to the United States, 
which would result in incarceration on death row, would be tantamount to 
subjecting him to psychological torture.86 The court agreed.87  
Since the term was coined, inmates and advocates have used it to describe 
the suffering that occurs on death row. And, as previously mentioned, 
judges, scholars, mental health experts, and prison officials agree that “a 
condemned prisoner’s mental ordeal approaches the limit of human endur-
 
80 William A. Schabas, Developments in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Execution Delayed, 
Execution Denied, 5 CRIM. L.F. 180, 184 (1994). 
81 See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972) (in bank), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27, as recognized in Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
82 In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890). 
83 Anderson, 493 P.2d at 894; see also Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death sentence is not a rare 
phenomenon.”), abrogated by Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
84 Amy Smith, Not “Waiving” but Drowning: The Anatomy of Death Row Syndrome and Volun-
teering for Execution, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 238 (2008). Although the terms are often used 
interchangeably, Smith distinguishes between “death row phenomenon” and “death row syndrome.” 
See id. at 242. She defines “death row phenomenon” as a term used to describe “the experience of 
living in the harsh conditions of death row for a long period of time under the sentence of death.” 
Id. at 238. “Death row syndrome,” on the other hand, is a term “used recently in the legal arena to 
describe the psychological effects of death row phenomenon on individuals.” Id. 
85 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). 
86 See id. at 11, 41 (describing the murders and Soering’s fears of psychological trauma on 
death row). 
87 See id. at 44-45 (“[T]he legitimate purpose of extradition could be achieved by another 
means which would not involve suffering of such exceptional intensity or duration.”). 
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ance.”88 However, despite the notion of medical legitimacy this terminology 
invokes, death row syndrome has not been formally recognized by mental 
health professionals.89 Similarly, although the suffering on death row is 
widely recognized as problematic, inmates have not succeeded in obtaining 
relief from the courts when raising death row syndrome in a Lackey claim. 
III. THE COURT’S DEBATE 
Although the Court has never granted certiorari in a case raising a Lackey 
claim, several Justices have engaged in a lively debate regarding the merits 
of the inordinate delay argument. Justice Breyer and Justice Stevens have 
consistently urged the Court to confront this issue, which, they claim, finds 
support in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.90 Justice Thomas, 
however, has concurred on multiple occasions in the denial of certiorari and 
has vehemently rejected Lackey claims.91 
 
88 Flynn, supra note 79, at 298; see id. at 298 n.36 (quoting a former warden at San Quentin 
prison who said, “[T]he length of time spent [on death row] by [some inmates] constitutes cruelty 
that defies the imagination” (second alteration in original) (quoting CLINTON T. DUFFY, EIGHTY-
EIGHT MEN AND TWO WOMEN 254 (1988))); see also supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
89 See Smith, supra note 84, at 243 (noting that, as of 2008, the terms “death row syndrome” 
and “death row phenomenon” had not been accepted by the American Psychiatric or Psychological 
Associations). 
90 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting 
the denial of certiorari) (explaining that, “[t]hough novel, petitioner’s claim is not without 
foundation,” because the rationale for the Court’s holding that the Eighth Amendment does not 
prohibit capital punishment arguably loses force when a prisoner is forced to spend so many years 
on death row). 
91 See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 544 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
denial of stay of execution and certiorari) (stating that he is “unaware of any constitutional 
support for the [Lackey] argument”); Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1301 (2009) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“It makes ‘a mockery of our system of justice . . . for a 
convicted murderer, who, through his own interminable efforts of delay . . . has secured the 
almost-indefinite postponement of his sentence, to then claim that the almost-indefinite post-
ponement renders his sentence unconstitutional.” (ellipses in original) (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 
F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring in the judgment))); Foster v. Florida, 537 
U.S. 990, 990-91 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“In the three years 
since we last debated this meritless claim . . . nothing has changed in our constitutional jurispru-
dence.”); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of 
certiorari) (“I am unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this 
Court’s precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of 
appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.”). 
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A. In Support of Granting Certiorari and Recognizing a Valid Constitutional 
Claim Based on Inordinate Delay: Justices Stevens and Breyer 
Justices Stevens and Breyer contend that executing inmates who have 
long been incarcerated on death row can constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment for several reasons. They assert that the amount of time Lackey 
petitioners spend awaiting execution—usually between twenty and thirty 
years—is undoubtedly unusual when viewed in light of the average length 
of death row confinement.92 Justices Stevens and Breyer also rely on the 
Court’s previous acknowledgement of the horrors of the death row experience 
to support their conclusion that the combination of uncertainty of execution 
and lengthy delay is cruel.93  
Although Justice Stevens, in his Lackey memorandum, found it proper to 
provide lower courts with an opportunity to consider the merits of the 
inordinate-delay claim, he also expressed his opinion that the execution of 
Clarence Lackey might fail to comport with established Eighth Amendment 
principles.94 While the death penalty can be justified on the bases that it 
was considered an acceptable punishment by the Framers and that it serves 
retributive and deterrent purposes,95 Justice Stevens suspected that “neither 
ground retains any force for prisoners who have spent some 17 years under a 
sentence of death.”96  
In a later case, Justice Breyer echoed Justice Stevens’s doubt as to 
whether the penological goals served by the death penalty retain their force 
after an inordinate delay. “[T]he longer the delay,” he noted, “the weaker 
the justifications for imposing the death penalty in terms of punishment’s 
basic retributive or deterrent purposes.”97 Justices Stevens and Breyer have 
 
92 See Foster, 537 U.S. at 992 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) 
(“[Twenty-seven] years awaiting execution is unusual by any standard, even that of current 
practice in the United States, where the average executed prisoner spends between 11 and 12 years 
under sentence of death.”).  
93 See id. (“This Court has recognized that such a combination can inflict ‘horrible feelings’ 
and ‘an immense mental anxiety amounting to a great increase of the offender’s punishment.’” 
(quoting In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890)) (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288-89 
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring))); see also supra Part II.  
94 See Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-47 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
95 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176-84 (1976) (plurality opinion) (canvassing the factors 
that militate in favor of finding the death penalty constitutional).  
96 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari); 
see also id. (“Such a delay, if it ever occurred, certainly would have been rare in 1789, and thus the 
practice of the Framers would not justify a denial of petitioner’s claim. Moreover, after such an 
extended time, the acceptable state interest in retribution has arguably been satisfied by the severe 
punishment already inflicted.”).  
97 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari).  
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suggested that the punishment already inflicted on the inmates during their 
lengthy imprisonment on death row sufficiently serves states’ interest in 
retribution.98 Additionally, they agree that there is minimal incremental 
deterrent value in executing an inmate after a long delay on death row as 
opposed to simply continuing to incarcerate the prisoner for life.99 
Three years after Lackey, petitioner William D. Elledge presented the 
same constitutional question to the Court, this time after a twenty-three year 
term on death row.100 Justice Breyer, the sole dissenter from the denial of 
certiorari, declared, “[P]etitioner argues forcefully that his execution would 
be especially ‘cruel.’ Not only has he, in prison, faced the threat of death for 
nearly a generation, but he has experienced that delay because of the State’s 
own faulty procedures and not because of frivolous appeals on his own 
part.”101 Justices Breyer and Stevens have acknowledged in several cases that 
identifying the actor responsible for the inmate’s delayed execution—be it 
either the State or the petitioner himself—is important in determining the 
validity of a petitioner’s Lackey claim. In his Lackey memorandum, Justice 
Stevens suggested that “[i]t may be appropriate to distinguish, for example, 
among delays resulting from (a) a petitioner’s abuse of the judicial system 
by escape or repetitive, frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner’s legitimate 
exercise of his right to review; and (c) negligence or deliberate action by the 
State.”102 Where most of the delay is attributable to the State, Justice 
Stevens suggests and Justice Breyer contends that the prisoner should not 
be held responsible, thereby giving greater force to the argument that death 
after inordinate delay is cruel and unusual.103 
Justice Breyer has used international precedent to support his contention 
that execution after inordinate delay is inconsistent with the Eighth Amend-
ment. In Knight v. Florida, he highlighted the fact that “[a] growing number 
of courts outside the United States—courts that accept or assume the lawfulness 
 
98 See id.; Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). 
99 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1046 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari).  
100 Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari).  
101 Id. at 945. 
102 514 U.S. at 1047 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).  
103 See id.; Elledge, 525 U.S. at 945 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). In 
Elledge, Justice Breyer recognized that the petitioner’s execution would be especially cruel because 
the greater part of the prisoner’s twenty-three-year term on death row was attributable to the 
State. Id. Justice Breyer calculated that the petitioner’s three successful appeals of his sentence 
resulted in eighteen of the total twenty-three years of delay. See id.; see also Knight v. Florida, 528 
U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (“Where a delay, 
measured in decades, reflects the State’s own failure to comply with the Constitution’s demands, 
the claim that time has rendered the execution inhuman is a particularly strong one.”); infra 
Section V.D. 
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of the death penalty—have held that lengthy delay in administering a lawful 
death penalty renders ultimate execution inhuman, degrading, or unusually 
cruel.”104 For support, Justice Breyer cited decisions from the U.K.’s Privy 
Council,105 India,106 Zimbabwe,107 as well as the decision of the European 
Court of Human Rights in Soering.108 Justice Breyer maintained that 
international opinion is “useful even though not binding” in determining 
the constitutionality of such a punishment.109 
In 2009, in Thompson v. McNeil, the Court again refused to hear a Lackey 
claim, this time raised by a petitioner who had spent thirty-two years on 
death row.110 Justice Stevens acknowledged the inherent tension underlying 
the claim that execution after a lengthy incarceration on death row violates 
the Eighth Amendment. He noted that the due process requirements that 
must be observed before an execution may take place render “delays in 
state-sponsored killings . . . inescapable,”111 but nevertheless concluded that 
executing defendants after such delays is unacceptably cruel. This inevitable 
cruelty, coupled with the diminished justification for carrying out an execu-
tion after the lapse of so much time, reinforces my opinion that contemporary 
decisions “to retain the death penalty as a part of our law are the product of 
habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative process.”112 
Since Justice Stevens left the Court, Justice Breyer has continued to 
advocate, although unsuccessfully, that the Court grant certiorari to consider 
a Lackey claim.113 
 
104 528 U.S. at 995 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
105 Pratt v. Att’y Gen., [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.). 
106 Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 465 (India). 
107 Catholic Comm’n for Justice & Peace in Zimb. v. Att’y-Gen., [1993] 1 Zimb. L.R. 239, 
reprinted in 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 323 (1993). 
108 Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). 
109 Knight, 528 U.S. at 998 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); see id. at 997 
(noting that the Supreme Court has often “found particularly instructive opinions of former 
Commonwealth nations insofar as those opinions reflect a legal tradition that also underlies our 
own Eighth Amendment”). Justice Breyer also observed that international opinion on this issue 
varies and cited countries, such as Canada, that do not necessarily condemn the practice of 
execution after inordinate delay. Id. at 996. 
110 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).  
111 Id. at 1300. 
112 Id. (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judg-
ment)). 
113 See Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of stay) 
(voting to grant the application for stay of execution and to grant certiorari to petitioner). 
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B. Against Granting Certiorari and Recognizing a Valid Constitutional  
Claim Based on Inordinate Delay: Justice Thomas 
Justice Thomas entered the debate over the merits of the inordinate- 
delay claim in 1999.114 In Knight v. Florida, the Court denied certiorari in 
two consolidated cases in which defendants challenged the constitutionality 
of their executions after spending nineteen and twenty-five years, respec-
tively, on death row.115 In this and every case since in which Justice Thomas 
has concurred in the denial of certiorari to petitioners raising a Lackey claim, 
he has emphasized his lack of awareness “of any support in the American 
constitutional tradition or in this Court’s precedent for the proposition that 
a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral 
procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.”116 
Unconvinced that the delay between sentencing and execution creates an 
Eighth Amendment problem—particularly when this delay is due to the 
inmate’s exercise of his right to appeal—Justice Thomas has argued that 
“[t]he issue is not whether a death-row inmate’s appeals ‘waive’ any Eighth 
Amendment right” but instead whether his “litigation strategy, which 
delays his execution, provides a justification for the Court to invent a new 
Eighth Amendment right. It does not.”117 Justice Thomas has refused to 
accept the argument that a delay in execution can justify the commutation 
of a death sentence to life imprisonment. He has noted that the “Court’s 
vacatur of a death sentence because of constitutional error does not bar new 
sentencing proceedings resulting in a reimposition of the death penalty”: 
the Court would not grant such a remedy even “to a death-row inmate who 
had suffered the most egregious of constitutional errors in his sentencing 
proceedings.”118 
Further, Justice Thomas views Justices Breyer and Stevens’s reliance on 
the international consensus regarding the unusual cruelty of inordinate 
delay as evidence underscoring the absence of support in American constitu-
tional jurisprudence.119 In response to the argument that the conditions of 
confinement on death row are “dehumanizing,” Justice Thomas cautions 
 
114 528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari). 
115 Id. at 993-94 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
116 Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari). 
117 Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1301 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).  
118 Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari). 
119 See Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“[W]ere 
there any such support in our own jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for proponents of the 
claim to rely on the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the 
Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council.”); infra note 91. 
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against second-guessing decisions regarding prison management.120 He also 
emphasizes that there could be “legitimate penological reasons” for the 
conditions of death row confinement.121 Justice Thomas stresses in Thompson 
the “gruesome nature” of the underlying crime for which the defendant was 
sentenced to death by three different juries.122 He argues that the only cruel 
element in these cases is the defendant’s crime, not the resulting punish-
ment or inevitable delay prior to execution.123 
Justice Thomas also advances several arguments against recognizing a 
valid Eighth Amendment claim based on inordinate delay. First, he con-
tends that delays in execution are an inherent consequence of the Court’s 
death penalty jurisprudence, which provides inmates with an “arsenal” of 
constitutional claims.124 Providing death row inmates with another constitu-
tional claim based on delay in execution would only lead to further delays, 
and would run the risk of creating perverse incentives for reviewing courts.125 
Despite Justice Stevens’s repeated assertion that the denial of a petition for 
a writ of certiorari is not a ruling on the merits,126 the Court’s consistent 
refusal to consider a Lackey claim suggests that a majority of the Court is 
not persuaded that execution after lengthy incarceration on death row 
violates Eighth Amendment principles.127 
 
120 See Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1301 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) 
(contemplating the “disastrous consequences of th[e] Court’s recent foray into prison manage-
ment” in Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005)). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 1302 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari); see also id. (admonishing 
Justice Stevens for “altogether refus[ing] to take into consideration the gruesome nature of the 
crimes that legitimately lead States to authorize the death penalty and juries to impose it”); Foster, 
537 U.S. at 991 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (describing the petitioner’s 
crime in graphic detail). 
123 See Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1303 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (“It is 
the crime—and not the punishment imposed by the jury or the delay in petitioner’s execution—
that was ‘unacceptably cruel.’” (quoting id. at 1300 (statement of Stevens, J., respecting the denial 
of certiorari))). 
124 See Knight, 528 U.S. at 992 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari) (arguing 
that it would be incongruous to permit inmates to complain of delay, given that their numerous 
opportunities to litigate their claims invariably result in that very delay). 
125 See id. (positing that courts may “give short shrift to a capital defendant’s legitimate 
claims so as to avoid violating the [suggested] Eighth Amendment right” by lengthening the delay 
and running afoul of the Eighth Amendment).  
126 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the 
denial of certiorari); see also Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (statement of Stevens, J., respecting the denial 
of certiorari) (“It seems appropriate to emphasize that the denial of these petitions for certiorari 
does not constitute a ruling on the merits.”). 
127 Justices Stevens and Breyer seem to have conceded this point. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 
130 S. Ct. 541, 544 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (“Most  
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IV. DOES INORDINATE DELAY ON DEATH ROW VIOLATE THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT? CHECKING IN ON THE EXPERIMENT 
Five years after Lackey invited the “state and lower courts to serve as 
‘laboratories’” to test the “viability” of the Lackey claim, the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in Knight. Concurring in that denial, Justice Thomas boldly 
asserted that “[t]hese courts have resoundingly rejected the claim as merit-
less . . . [and therefore that] the Court should consider the experiment 
concluded.”128 But is this really the case? In an opinion dissenting from the 
denial of certiorari, Justice Breyer vehemently disagreed. He argued that 
only eight of over twenty cases addressing the issue of inordinate delays in 
execution since 1995 were decided solely on the merits of the Lackey claim, 
and that most cases “involve[d] procedural failings that in part or in whole 
determined the outcome of the case.”129 Further, Justice Breyer pointed out 
that the few cases that did address Lackey claims on its merits failed to 
consider that much of the delay is attributable to failings of the State rather 
than the petitioner.130  
A survey of cases in which lower courts confront Lackey claims demon-
strates that, in a sense, Justice Thomas is correct. Courts have overwhelm-
ingly rejected Lackey claims over the past sixteen years. However, Justice 
Breyer is also correct that the reason for these rejections is mostly procedural. 
Lower courts have not considered the merits of this important issue enough 
to warrant the conclusion that the experiment is over.  
In 2009, Justice Stevens remarked in Johnson v. Bredesen—another case 
in which the Court denied certiorari—that when he first discussed the claim 
of inordinate delay in Lackey, he did not foresee that procedure would prevent 
an individual from arguing that “nearly three decades of delay on death row, 
much of it caused by the State, [would] deprive[] a person of his Eighth 
Amendment right to avoid cruel and unusual punishment.”131 And indeed, 
there have been numerous procedural obstacles barring lower courts from 
 
regrettably, a majority of this Court continues to find these issues not of sufficient weight to merit 
our attention.”). 
128 Knight, 528 U.S. at 992-93 (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari); see id. at 
992-93 & n.4 (citing eight state court cases in support of this assertion, and noting that he was 
“not aware of a single American court that has accepted such an Eighth Amendment claim”).  
129 Id. at 998-99 (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari); see id. at 999 (noting 
that the experiment had not yet concluded, considering the fact that none of the opinions in the 
lower courts “discuss the potential significance of that state responsibility at any length”). 
130 See id. at 998-99. 
131 130 S. Ct. at 544 (statement of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of stay of execution and 
certiorari).  
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contemplating the merits of a Lackey claim. This Part will highlight two of 
the most common procedural issues encountered by petitioners.  
A. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: Lackey Claims Are 
Barred If Presented in Second or Successive Habeas Petitions  
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)132 
presents procedural obstacles to death row inmates seeking to challenge 
their execution after long delays on death row. “[D]esigned to limit the role 
of the federal courts in what is essentially a state proceeding,” AEDPA 
dramatically reformed the process of federal habeas corpus.133  
One component of AEDPA—a “gatekeeping” provision—restricts second 
or successive petitions for habeas corpus relief.134 The Act provides that “a 
claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application . . . that 
was not presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.”135 The Supreme 
Court noted in Williams v. Taylor that AEDPA was passed “to further the 
principles of finality, comity, and federalism.”136 Lackey claims implicate 
AEDPA by their very nature. A petitioner’s Lackey claim is not ripe until 
the inmate has been confined on death row for many years. Thus, by the 
time the petitioner is able to assert a claim based on inordinate delay, he 
will have typically already filed his first habeas petition. He will therefore 
be forced to make his request for relief in a second or successive petition.137  
Many states have similar prohibitions on second or successive habeas 
petitions. A similar gatekeeping provision in Utah’s postconviction-relief 
statute precluded a petitioner from raising a Lackey claim in state court in 
his third petition for postconviction relief.138 In Gardner v. State, the Utah 
 
132 Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
133 Connolly, supra note 32, at 102. 
134 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006). Prior to AEDPA, “[t]he doctrine of abuse of the writ 
define[d] the circumstances in which federal courts decline[d] to entertain a claim presented for 
the first time in a second or subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus.” McCleskey v. Zant, 
499 U.S. 467, 470 (1991). A petitioner who failed to raise a claim earlier needed to show “cause for 
failing to raise it and prejudice therefrom.” Id. at 494. AEDPA placed narrower restraints on when 
courts could entertain claims raised in second or successive petitions. See United States v. 
Roberson, 194 F.3d 408, 410-11 (3d Cir. 1999). 
135 Id. § 2244(b)(2). 
136 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). 
137 See, e.g., Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s 
holding that petitioner’s claims were covered by AEDPA’s prohibition on second or successive 
habeas petitions). 
138 Gardner v. State, 234 P.3d 1115, 1136 (Utah 2010) (“We conclude that Mr. Gardner could 
have raised these claims in his second state petition for post-conviction relief, filed in state court 
in May 2000, or at any other time in the year after this evidence was adduced in 1999, and that he 
is therefore barred from raising it in this successive petition.”). 
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Supreme Court concluded that the petitioner’s claims could have been 
raised in his previous habeas petition and did not become ripe only upon 
the defendant’s most recent death warrant.139 Therefore, the court did not 
consider the merits of the claim.140 
However, AEDPA and similar state provisions contain exceptions to the 
second-and-successive-petition rule and therefore do not constitute a com-
plete bar to review of a Lackey claim. Scholars have suggested ways that 
courts can still consider the merits of a Lackey claim despite AEDPA. One 
has suggested applying the logic of Panetti v. Quarterman, a case involving 
claim of incompetency to be executed,141 to a Lackey claim.142 The Panetti 
Court stated that because a claim of incompetency does not become ripe 
until execution is imminent, AEDPA does not bar such a claim.143 Similarly: 
 Since a federal court could not resolve an unripe Lackey claim when the first 
habeas petition would be filed, allowing this particular class of petitioners 
(those who have experienced a prolonged period of confinement prior to 
their proposed execution) to file second or successive habeas petitions would 
simply not implicate AEDPA’s concern for finality.144 
However, the Panetti approach has not been applied to a Lackey claim, and 
as a result AEDPA has prevented the consideration of the constitutionality 
of inordinate delay. 
B. Retroactivity: Lackey Claims Are Teague-Barred 
In Teague v. Lane, the Supreme Court announced that the law at the 
time a petitioner’s judgment became final is the law that should apply to the 
adjudication of his constitutional claims in habeas proceedings.145 Writing 
for the Court in a part of the opinion joined by three other Justices in 
 
139 See id. at 1143-44 & nn.232-35; see id. at 1144 (determining that the defendant could have 
raised a Lackey claim in an earlier petition for postconviction relief because “at the time [he] filed 
his second state petition for post-conviction relief, he had been incarcerated for more than 
fourteen years”). 
140 Id. at 1144. 
141 551 U.S. 930 (2007). 
142 See Simmons, supra note 61, at 1266. 
143 Panetti, 551 U.S. at 945-48 (2007) (“We are hesitant to construe a statute, implemented to 
further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism, in a manner that would require 
unripe . . . claims to be raised as a mere formality . . . .”). 
144 Simmons, supra note 61, at 1266.  
145 See 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (“[H]abeas corpus cannot be used 
as a vehicle to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would be 
applied retroactively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two exceptions we 
have articulated.”).  
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Teague, Justice O’Connor articulated two narrow exceptions to this rule. A 
new rule of law should be retroactively applied if such a rule “places ‘certain 
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the 
criminal law-making authority to proscribe.’”146 Additionally, “a new rule 
should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of ‘those 
procedures that . . . “are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”’”147 
In determining whether a petitioner’s claim is Teague-barred, courts 
must first ascertain when the defendant’s conviction and sentence became 
final.148 Next, the court must assess whether a state court considering the 
defendant’s claim at the time “would have felt compelled by existing 
precedent to conclude that the rule [defendant] seeks was required by the 
Constitution.”149 Finally, the court must determine whether the new rule 
falls within one of the narrow exceptions articulated in Teague.150 
Teague appears to preclude Lackey claims automatically. It is almost incon-
ceivable that a claim of inordinate delay could develop before an inmate’s 
conviction and sentence becomes final, and there is no binding precedent 
for holding that an inordinate delay in execution violates the Eighth 
Amendment. A petitioner asserting a Lackey argument would require a new 
rule of constitutional law to be successful.151 
Indeed, federal courts have read Teague to bar them from considering 
Lackey claims. For example, the Ninth Circuit dismissed a Lackey claim of a 
petitioner who spent twenty-five years on death row in Montana because 
“at the time his conviction became final [a court] would not have felt 
compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] sought was 
required by the Constitution.”152 
 
146 Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring in two judgments and dissenting in a third)). 
147 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in two 
judgments and dissenting in a third) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))). 
148 See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (“A state conviction and sentence become 
final for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal to the state courts 
has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely 
filed petition has been finally denied.”). 
149 Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990). 
150 See Caspari, 510 U.S. at 390.  
151 See Simmons, supra note 61, at 1263 (noting that at first blush the Lackey claim might 
appear to be Teague-barred “because it requests application of a new constitutional rule to a 
judgment that has long since become final”). 
152 Smith v. Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Allen v. Ornoski, 435 
F.3d 946, 955 (9th Cir. 2006) (determining that “[t]here is no clearly established federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court, to support” the petitioner’s claim). The Fifth Circuit has also 
ruled that the Lackey claim—indeed, the original Lackey claim—is Teague-barred. That court 
vacated the district court’s stay of Clarence Lackey’s execution in 1995, noting that “Teague’s 
n0onretroactivity doctrine bars Lackey’s current claim.” Lackey v. Scott, 52 F.3d 98, 100 (5th  
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But Teague need not serve as a bar to Lackey claims. One author suggests 
that the procedural hurdle posed in Teague does not apply if the petitioner 
characterizes his Lackey claim as a “demand for relief for a post-conviction 
constitutional violation” as opposed to a collateral attack on the petitioner’s 
final judgment.153 If a court agrees with this argument, then Teague does not 
apply.154 Alternatively, a petitioner could clear the Teague hurdle by claiming 
that one of Teague’s two exceptions applies. The new rule required by a 
Lackey claim arguably satisfies either exception.155 A Lackey claim could 
satisfy the first Teague exception because it is supported by substantive 
constitutional law and “does not propose a new rule of criminal proce-
dure.”156 Further, a Lackey claim falls within the first exception to Teague 
given that it places a class of individuals—death row prisoners with lengthy 
delays—beyond the state’s power to execute.157 In Penry v. Lynaugh, the 
Court determined that Teague did not prevent it from considering the 
merits of the defendant’s argument that his execution would violate the 
Eighth Amendment given that he had the “reasoning capacity of a 7-year-
old.”158 Writing for a unanimous Court,159 Justice O’Connor explained that 
the defendant’s claim fell within the first Teague exception because “a new 
rule placing a certain class of individuals beyond the State’s power to punish 
by death is analogous to a new rule placing certain conduct beyond the 
State’s power to punish at all.”160 Alternatively, the Lackey claim might 
satisfy the second Teague exception because the claim rests on the funda-
mental constitutional principles underlying the Eighth Amendment’s ban 
on cruel and unusual punishment.161 A court’s acceptance of either of these 
 
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 514 U.S. 1093 (1995); see also Chambers v. Dretke, 145 F. App’x 468, 472 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (declaring that the district court’s resolution that petitioner’s claim was Teague-barred 
was “not debatable.”). 
153 Simmons, supra note 61, at 1263; see Flynn, supra note 79, at 316 (“Although prisoners raise 
Lackey claims collaterally through habeas petitions, these claims do not attack the constitutionality 
of initial state court proceedings, but instead seek relief for the state’s postjudgment action.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 1264.  
156 Id. 
157 See Flynn, supra note 79, at 317 (“Because Lackey claims propose that lengthy death row 
incarceration renders a class of death row prisoners constitutionally ineligible for the death 
penalty, such claims should escape Teague’s bar under this exception.” (footnote omitted)). 
158 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989). 
159 All the Justices joined in Part IV-A of Justice O’Connor’s opinion. See id. at 306. 
160 Id. at 330. Justice O’Connor further noted that “[i]n both cases, the Constitution itself 
deprives the State of the power to impose a certain penalty, and the finality and comity concerns . . . 
have little force.” Id. 
161 Simmons, supra note 61, at 1264; see Flynn, supra note 79, at 318 (“Teague doctrine permits 
retroactive application of new rules concerning bedrock constitutional principles ‘implicit in the  
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arguments would provide an opportunity to consider the substantive merits 
of the Lackey claim. 
Thus, although Teague has prevented some courts from reaching the 
merits of a Lackey claim, it is possible for a court to review a Lackey claim by 
construing Teague’s limits as inapplicable. 
Overall, procedural issues dispose of a number of Lackey claims without 
consideration of the claim’s substantive arguments. The procedural issues 
have been compounded by Justice Thomas’s declaration in Knight that the 
experiment in the lower courts had “concluded”162—an assertion that has 
further discouraged lower court judges from considering petitioners’ 
arguments in support of their Lackey claims.163 Justice Thomas’s assertion 
has become somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy—not because courts have 
agreed with his assessment of the Lackey claim after careful consideration, 
but because procedure has stood in the way of a careful review of the claim 
by state and lower federal courts. 
In lieu of lower courts, academics have stepped in to undertake an in-
depth analysis of the Lackey claim. Several authors have persuasively argued 
that despite the limited treatment of the Lackey claim in the lower courts, an 
inordinate delay between death sentences and execution does violate estab-
lished Eighth Amendment principles.164 Many have urged the Supreme 
Court to declare such delays unconstitutional, and their arguments closely 
track those raised by Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer.165 Execution after 
long delays on death row violates the Eighth Amendment and fails to meet 
the standard set forth in Furman and Gregg, because execution under these 
circumstances would have been unacceptable to the Framers and lacks a 
robust retributive or deterrent justification.166 
 
concept of ordered liberty.’ The Lackey claim rests on the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment, a fundamental constitutional guarantee.” (footnotes and citation omitted)). 
162 See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of 
certiorari). 
163 See, e.g., Bieghler v. State, 839 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ind. 2005) (“We also noted Justice 
Thomas’s subsequent observation in Knight v. Florida that Lackey claims had been rejected by the 
courts that have considered them.” (citations omitted)). 
164 See, e.g., Aarons, supra note 35, at 206; Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of this Mess: Steps Toward 
Addressing and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 40 
(1998) (noting that a capital defendant’s “Eighth Amendment . . . claim is analogous to a claim 
based on the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial”); Root, supra note 64, at 316-17 (“The 
central tenet of the Eighth Amendment claim is that an execution after a period of inordinate 
delay no longer serves any legitimate social purpose. Indeed, lengthy delays would have been 
unimaginable to the framers of the constitution, so they cannot be justified via the framers’ intent.”). 
165 See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 32, at 116-30; Flynn, supra note 79, at 332-33. 
166 Jessica Feldman, Comment, A Death Row Incarceration Calculus: When Prolonged Death 
Row Imprisonment Becomes Unconstitutional, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 187, 199 (1999) (“If the  
  




As Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer suggest, inordinate delay on death 
row can run afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment.167 However, numerous procedural obstacles have stunted the 
“experiment” which began in the lower courts over fifteen years ago. As a 
result, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to consider the arguments 
raised by death row inmates challenging delayed executions. 
Scholars have proposed solutions to facilitate courts’ consideration of 
the merits of a Lackey claim. For example, one author recommended that 
courts treat the Lackey claim as a matter of first impression, because so few 
courts have actually substantively opined on the constitutionality of inordi-
nate delay.168 
While litigants should continue to seek validation of Lackey claims in the 
courts, legislative solutions are also available. This Part briefly discusses 
three broad solutions that, although not wholly responsive to the Lackey 
problem, could provide relief to inmates or prevent future inordinate delays. 
It then outlines more narrowly tailored measures that legislatures should 
adopt to solve the Lackey problem. 
A. Abolishing the Death Penalty 
One obvious way to dispose of the inordinate delay problem is to elimi-
nate capital punishment altogether. As scholars Carol Steiker and Jordan 
Steiker observe, “[T]he significance of the [issue raised by the Lackey claim] 
is the way in which it highlights the ‘American capital punishment phenom-
enon’—the prevailing fragility of the death penalty in this country given the 
ongoing, pronounced inability of states to consummate death sentences with 
executions.”169  
 
Framers did not intend prisoners to sit on death row for years awaiting execution, and if neither 
retribution nor deterrence is served by executing prisoners after a lengthy delay, then an execution 
after such a delay fails the Gregg test and conflicts with the Eighth Amendment.”). 
167 See Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting 
the denial of certiorari) (“[B]oth Justice Breyer and I have noted that substantially delayed 
executions arguably violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.”). 
168 See McMahon, supra note 76, at 59-62 (“The simple reality is that more states than not 
haven’t encountered this issue and are now barred from seriously considering it.”). 
169 Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous 
Debate, 100 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 685-86 (2010).  
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Opponents of state-sanctioned killing have long advocated abolition of 
capital punishment for reasons beyond those behind the Lackey problem. 
Several Supreme Court Justices—including Marshall, Brennan, and Ste-
vens—have concluded that capital punishment is per se unconstitutional.170 
Additionally, popular support for the death penalty has waned in recent 
years; in 2011, it dropped to its lowest level since 1972, the year that Georgia’s 
capital punishment scheme was declared unconstitutional in Furman.171 
Recently, several states have initiated legislation to repeal the death 
penalty. In 2011, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed legislation abolishing 
the death penalty and commuted fifteen death sentences to life without 
parole following a decade-long moratorium on executions.172 Following on 
the heels of states like New Jersey and New Mexico, Illinois became the 
sixteenth state to eliminate capital punishment.173 Quinn’s belief is that “[i]t 
is impossible to create a perfect system, free of all mistakes . . . [and that] 
it’s the right and just thing to abolish the death penalty and punish those 
 
170 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 369-72 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (concluding that “capital punishment cannot stand”). In Gregg v. 
Georgia, Justice Stewart wrote for a plurality of the Court: 
Although this issue [of whether capital punishment is per se unconstitutional] was 
presented and addressed in Furman, it was not resolved by the Court. Four Justices 
[Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist] would have held that capital punishment 
is not unconstitutional per se; two Justices [Brennan and Marshall] would have 
reached the opposite conclusion; and three Justices [Douglas, Stewart, and White], 
while agreeing that the statutes then before the Court were invalid as applied, left 
open the question whether such punishment may ever be imposed. 
428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted). Justice Stevens has voiced this 
opinion more recently. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“I have relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of 
the death penalty represents ‘the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal 
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.’” (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 
(White, J., concurring))). “With his concurring opinion in Baze, Justice Stevens became the fifth 
Gregg Justice to declare that capital punishment violates the Eighth Amendment.” Elisabeth 
Semel, Reflections on Justice John Paul Stevens’s Concurring Opinion in Baze v. Rees: A Fifth Gregg 
Justice Renounces Capital Punishment, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 783, 791 (2010). 
171 See Frank Newport, In U.S., Support for Death Penalty Falls to 39-Year Low, GALLUP (Oct. 13, 
2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150089/support-death-penalty-falls-year-low.aspx (noting that this 
poll was taken soon after the controversial execution of Troy Davis in Georgia, although “high-
profile executions” in previous years were not accompanied by similar decreases in support for 
capital punishment). 
172 See Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty, NPR (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/ 
09/134394946/illinois-abolishes-death-penalty. 
173 States with and without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www. 
deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
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who commit heinous crimes—evil people—with life in prison without 
parole or any chance of release.”174 
In 2012, legislators introduced abolition bills in eleven states, including 
Connecticut, Georgia, Nebraska, Missouri, Maryland, Kentucky, and Kansas, 
although only one successfully passed:175 On April 25, 2012, Connecticut 
became the seventeenth state to abolish the death penalty.176 Governor 
Dannel P. Malloy signed into law legislation that repealed capital punish-
ment for future crimes—although this law does not apply to the eleven men 
currently imprisoned on death row in the state.177 Malloy stated that he 
“came to believe that doing away with the death penalty was the only way 
to ensure it would not be unfairly imposed.”178 Malloy cited the fact that the 
eleven men currently on death row in Connecticut “are far more likely to 
die of old age than be put to death” to underscore the unworkability of the 
state’s death penalty law.179 Abolition bills have also been proposed in 
Maryland and Texas for 2013, and legislators in several other states plan to 
introduce similar bills this session.180 
While this trend is gaining momentum, it is extremely unlikely that the 
thirty-three states that still impose the death penalty will all abolish the 
practice.181 Even still, the repeal of capital punishment and commutation of 
death sentences to life sentences could provide relief to prisoners who have 
suffered as a result of their lengthy confinement on death row. 
 
174 Ray Long & Todd Wilson, Gov. Pat Quinn Turned to Bible and Writings of Late Cardinal 
Joseph Bernardin for Difficult Death Penalty Decision, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 10, 2011), http://articles. 
chicagotribune.com/2011-03-10/news/ct-met-illinois-death-penalty-bill-si20110309_1_death-penalty-pat- 
quinn-families-of-murder-victims. 
175 2012—Legislation, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2012-
Legislation (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (listing state-by-state legislation (proposed and/or passed in 
2012) regarding the death penalty). 
176 Daniela Altimari, Without Fanfare, Malloy Signs Bill Abolishing Death Penalty, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Apr. 25, 2012), http://articles.courant.com/2012-04-25/news/hc-death-penalty-signing-
0426-20120425_1_death-penalty-gail-canzano-capital-punishment. 
177 Id. 
178 Recent Legislation: Governor’s Signature Makes Connecticut Fifth State in Five Years to End 
Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/recent-legislation- 
governors-signature-makes-connecticut-fifth-state-five-years-end-death-penalty (last visited Jan. 
11, 2013). 
179 Id. 
180 See Recent Legislative Activity, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/recent-legislative-activity (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (listing recent state-by-state legislation 
(proposed and passed) regarding the death penalty). 
181 This scenario is particularly unlikely, as some of the remaining states—such as California, 
Texas, and Florida—have the largest populations on death row. See DEATH ROW U.S.A., supra 
note 21, at 32-61 (listing the number of death row inmates per state). 
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B. Reforming the Capital Appeals and Habeas Processes 
There are numerous countervailing policy considerations that caution 
courts and legislatures against adopting bright-line rules or quick fixes to 
solve the problems associated with inordinate delays on death row.182 
Unlike those who advocate abolishing the death penalty, other scholars who 
favor capital punishment propose reforms to streamline the capital appeals 
and habeas process out of the recognition that this part of the litigation 
cycle accounts for much of the delay on death row. 
Some scholars have proposed alternatives that could prevent future 
Lackey violations by making the system more efficient. State legislatures 
should consider implementing some of these suggestions in order to help 
avoid future Lackey claims. For example, a provision providing funding, 
training, and resources for those who represent indigent defendants could 
reduce the likelihood of ineffective assistance. However, Professor Eve 
Brensike Primus argues that such reforms are unlikely to occur—or if they 
were to occur, that they would be unlikely to wholly solve the problem.183 
Instead, Professor Primus suggests a structural reform that would help 
alleviate the problems associated with ineffectiveness of counsel, an issue 
which many inmates raise in collateral challenges to their conviction and 
sentences.184 Specifically, she recommends allowing the issue of ineffective 
assistance to be raised by attorneys on direct appeal, rather than requiring 
defendants to make this claim only on postconviction review.185 Although 
this change could ensure that future prisoners do not spend the staggering 
amount of time on death row that many do now, these suggestions will not 
help those currently raising Lackey claims find recognition of their constitu-
tional challenge or relief from their suffering. 
C. Improving Death Row Conditions 
Although it is not a complete solution, another way to partially resolve 
the problems underlying the Lackey claim is to improve the conditions of 
confinement on death row. Around the time that Justice Stevens issued his 
Lackey memorandum, scholars Robert Johnson and John L. Carroll observed 
 
182 For example, there are perverse incentives for reviewing courts (raised by Justice Thomas 
in Knight), as well as incentives for inmates to file frivolous claims purposefully to delay incarceration 
on death row as a predicate for raising a Lackey claim later. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying 
text. 
183 See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 684, 706 (2007).  
184 Id. at 706-09. 
185 Id. at 706. 
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that “the treatment of death-row prisoners has not kept pace with the 
development of their rights on appeal. . . . What formerly was a brief but 
debilitating experience has now become a seemingly endless and agonizing 
one.”186 Conditions are uniformly stark on death rows across the country.187 
In addition to the emotional stress that stems from awaiting execution, 
death row inmates further suffer in “a prison within a prison, physically and 
socially isolated from the prison community and the outside world.”188 
Professor Melvin Urofsky posited that “[i]f one is going to argue that even 
condemned murderers retain some spark of humanity, some rights of 
individual autonomy, then something must be done to either improve death 
row conditions, or permit those who wish to terminate that existence 
through execution of sentence the right to do so.”189 
Despite the political unpopularity of providing additional resources and 
funding to death row inmates, some states have initiated successful reforms 
to improve conditions on death row. An example of early reform took place in 
Tucker, Arkansas, in 1968, prior to the Furman decision.190 Death row inmates 
were provided with the opportunity to integrate with the rest of the prison 
population during meals and other activities, and were also given extended 
recreational, visitation, and other privileges.191 In the mid-1980s, the Texas 
Department of Corrections began classifying death row inmates as either 
“death row work-capable” or “death row segregation,” and members of the 
former category were permitted to work in a factory or as janitors or orderlies 
during their period of incarceration.192 And the Missouri Department of 
 
186 Robert Johnson & John L. Carroll, Litigating Death Row Conditions: The Case for Reform, in 
PRISONERS AND THE LAW 8-3 (Ira P. Robbins ed., Release no. 31, 2004); see also Melvin I. 
Urofsky, A Right to Die: Termination of Appeal for Condemned Prisoners, 75 J. CRIM L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 553, 568-73 (1984) (detailing the horrid conditions of death row that often lead prisoners 
to waive their appeals). 
187 See Johnson & Carroll, supra note 186, at 8-4 (“Death-row living conditions vary little 
from state to state.”); see also supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. But see Mary A. Fischer, 
The Appeal of Death Row, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 2011, at 21 (discussing how one prisoner 
would prefer to be sentenced to death as he knows that an actual execution is unlikely, and living 
conditions on death row are better).  
188 Urofsky, supra note 186, at 571 (quoting ROBERT JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE: 
LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH 47 (1981)). 
189 Id. at 573. 
190 See George Lombardi, Richard D. Sluder & Donald Wallace, The Management of Death-
Sentenced Inmates: Issues, Realities, and Innovative Strategies 6 (Mar. 1996) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://doc.mo.gov/documents/DeathSentencedInmates.pdf (discussing dramatic death 
row reforms under the leadership of Warden Tom Murton). 
191 See id. (discussing this successful but brief reform, which was eventually dismantled by 
the Arkansas Board of Corrections).  
192 See id. (“Although the program was initially met with skepticism by staff, no serious inci-
dents were reported following implementation of reforms.” (citations omitted)). 
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Corrections reformed its management of death row inmates following a 
class action suit alleging constitutional deprivations. After entering into a 
consent decree, the department began classifying death row inmates into 
one of three custody levels with corresponding levels of privileges: regular 
custody, close custody, or no-contact custody.193 
In determining appropriate legislative responses to this problem, policy-
makers should balance considerations of institutional safety and security, 
the penological purposes that underlie the current structure of death row, 
and the fundamental needs of prisoners. Policymakers should also engage in 
an evaluation of the appropriate conditions on death row in light of the 
statistical data about the length of time inmates currently spend awaiting 
execution. Implementing even minor changes could provide significant 
benefits to death row inmates and alleviate some of the concerns that lie at 
the heart of the Lackey claim. However, such reforms provide only limited 
relief of the problem posed by inordinate delay, because “the mental 
suffering and anxiety caused by uncertainty of the final disposition of the 
sentence is an inherent characteristic of death row.”194  
D. Model Lackey Legislation 
With the exception of eliminating the death penalty altogether, the other 
alternatives presented here provide only limited help to current inmates or 
serve to prevent inordinate delays in the future. Although these reforms and 
proposals merit careful consideration by state legislatures, I propose a more 
narrowly tailored solution that precisely identifies which inmates are 
eligible for relief based on inordinate delay on death row and provides relief 
by commuting their death sentences to sentences of life without parole in 
certain circumstances. 
Professor Dwight Aarons proposes setting a date—twice the national 
average amount of time spent on death row—at which point an inmate’s 
Lackey claim becomes ripe, and his execution may run afoul of the Eighth 
Amendment.195 I propose adopting Aarons’s timeframe, but for a slightly 
different purpose. Incarceration for twice the national average, which today 
would be around twenty-nine years,196 should trigger an automatic review of 
the inmate’s time on death row by the state supreme court. The court 
 
193 Id. 
194 Feldman, supra note 166, at 209 n.197. 
195 See Aarons, supra note 35, at 207 (“While inordinate delay need not be strictly defined as 
twice the national average, this proposed bright line rule represents a choice that provides a ready 
reference point for capital cases.”). 
196 See SNELL, supra note 20, at 12 tbl.8 (178 months times two). 
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should then determine if continued incarceration and execution would 
violate the Eighth Amendment. The court would be tasked with creating a 
report that breaks down the procedural history of the prisoner’s case and 
details the inmate’s time on death row.197 This review should not burden the 
court, as the relevant information is readily available in court dockets and 
filings and requires minimal independent investigation. 
This analysis is critical to my further proposal operationalizing Justice 
Stevens’s recommendation in Lackey that the court consider the meaningful 
differences among delays caused by the inmate’s frivolous filings, the 
legitimate exercise of an inmate’s rights, and negligence or error by the 
state.198 The leading cause of the inmate’s delay should be the determinative 
factor in considering whether a constitutional violation has occurred.199 
1. Delay Caused by the Inmate’s Abuse of the Judicial System 
If the leading cause of a prisoner’s delay is, to use Justice Stevens’s lan-
guage, “a petitioner’s abuse of the judicial system by escape or repetitive, 
frivolous filings,”200 then no Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. 
This inquiry will focus on the petitioner’s abuse of the legal system by 
escape or repetitive filings, as it is unlikely that a court would characterize a 
claim, even a claim that may ordinarily be considered far-fetched, as 
frivolous.201 This is due to the fact that a lawyer’s ethical obligations to her 
client in a capital case require her to assert a claim based on “any conceivable 
error.”202 Further, while this provision serves as an important safeguard, 
 
197 While this task can be delegated to administrative staff or another body, the court needs 
to assess the constitutional issue. 
198 See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting 
the denial of certiorari) (noting how English jurists have made similar distinctions based on the 
cause of delay) (citing Pratt v. Att’y Gen., [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) 33 (appeal taken from Jam.)). 
199 The leading cause of delay is to be determined by the judge based on the report which 
will detail each inmate’s time on death row. This inquiry is akin to the type of causation determi-
nations judges make on a regular basis. Judges are therefore best suited to inquire into which cause 
accounts for more years of delay than any other. 
200 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
201 A frivolous claim has been defined by the court as one that is “clearly baseless”—this 
definition “encompass[es] allegations that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Denton v. 
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) (citations omitted). Although this definition is already a 
narrow one, especially in criminal cases “courts are loath to impose sanctions [for filing frivolous 
claims] against lawyers in any case in which the defendant’s liberty is at stake.” Monroe H. 
Freedman, The Professional Obligation to Raise Frivolous Issues in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1167, 1177-78 (2003). 
202 Id. at 1177-79 (“Counsel in a capital case must, as a matter of professional responsibility, 
raise every issue at every level of the proceedings that might conceivably persuade even one judge 
in an appeals court, or in the Supreme Court . . . .”). 
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frivolous filings are unlikely to be the leading cause for many inmates who 
have experienced delays of twenty-nine years. “[F]rivolous petitions 
account for an infinitesimal fraction” of delays in comparison to other 
causes of delay in the criminal justice system.203 The system has mecha-
nisms in place to prevent frivolous claims from being filed, including 
procedural rules and sanctions.204 In any case, the filing of a frivolous petition 
is unlikely to cause a delay of any significant length. One author notes that 
“[w]hen petitions that appear to be frivolous are filed, they are either dis-
missed without comment . . . or they are resoundingly condemned.”205 
Ensuring that an Eighth Amendment claim is not available to an inmate 
who caused his own delay would address Justice Thomas’s fear that recog-
nizing a Lackey claim would incentivize inmates to abuse the system so that 
they could later raise a claim based on the resulting delay. Indeed, it is 
critically important to distinguish between delays caused by the inmate and 
delays caused by other factors in order to ensure that relief granted to 
Lackey petitioners goes only to those who are deserving. A rigorous inquiry 
to this effect will prevent capital defense lawyers from purposefully drag-
ging out the postconviction litigation process.206 
2. Delay Caused by the Process of Judicial Review 
If the leading cause of a prisoner’s delay is the prisoner’s “legitimate 
exercise of his right to review,”207 then no constitutional violation has 
occurred. This measure also accounts for the inherent delays that result 
from the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence and the modern capital 
appeals process. It reflects the fact that thorough and sometimes repeated 
review of a prisoner’s claims is an integral part of the system which serves 
the compelling interest of ensuring accuracy. This time is essentially 
“neutral”—while death row inmates should not be “punished” by delays if 
they pursue appeals to which they are entitled, neither should this time be 
 
203 Root, supra note 64, at 299. 
204 See Aarons, supra note 35, at 46-47 (suggesting that frivolous filings are rare in capital 
cases, and noting that “[s]ignificiantly, it is hard to find reported cases imposing such sanctions”); 
Root, supra note 64, at 299 (“There is an extensive network of procedural rules in place that 
discourages the filing of frivolous, premature, or otherwise inappropriate petitions.”). 
205 Id. 
206 See David Margolick, At the Bar: Death Row Appeals Are Drawing Sharp Rebukes from Frus-
trated Federal Judges in the South, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1988, at B9 (“Unable to abolish capital 
punishment de jure, they are attempting it de facto, by making the process so protracted that it 
will ultimately be abandoned.”). 
207  Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the 
denial of certiorari). 
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counted against the state by a court assessing a Lackey claim. Additionally, 
this proposition further alleviates concerns that recognizing a Lackey claim 
would incentivize the judiciary to hastily review a prisoner’s claim lest the 
delay cause a constitutional violation.208 
3. Delay Caused by the State’s Misconduct or Negligence 
If the leading cause of a prisoner’s delay is the state’s “negligence or de-
liberate action,”209 then the prisoner’s sentence should be commuted to life 
without parole. Undoubtedly, the most compelling case for relief based on a 
Lackey claim arises when the State has protracted a prisoner’s stay on death 
row.210 For example, a Lackey claim would be recognized in cases with facts 
similar to those of Johnson v. Bredesen. In Johnson, a change in state law gave 
the petitioner access to evidence undermining eyewitness testimony against 
him eleven years after his conviction.211 Justice Stevens, dissenting from the 
denial of certiorari, explained that “[t]his evidence calls into question the 
persuasive force of the eyewitness’ testimony, and, consequently, whether 
Johnson’s conviction was infected with constitutional error.”212 He observed 
that “[w]e cannot know as a definitive matter whether, if the State had not 
withheld exculpatory evidence, Johnson would have been convicted of these 
crimes. We do know that Johnson would not have waited for 11 years on 
death row before the State met its disclosure obligations.”213 
But what players or institutions constitute “the State”? This term would 
incorporate those directly involved with the prosecution of the case, such as 
the district attorneys. Additionally, it would include the executive branch.214 
Therefore, moratoria imposed by governors would count against the state in 
the assessment of a Lackey claim, as they usually reflect a state’s inability—
albeit a temporary one—to execute inmates constitutionally. In California, 
for example, state officials requested more time before judicial review of a 
 
208 See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of 
certiorari). 
209 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047 (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
210 See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 542 (2009) (statement of Stevens, J., respecting 
the stay of execution and denial of certiorari) (“[S]tate-caused delay in state-sponsored killings can 
be unacceptably cruel.”). 
211 See id. 
212 Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). 
213 Id. 
214 The term would not include the Judiciary insofar as the action by the state is simply judicial 
decisionmaking. Intentional misconduct on the part of the Judiciary that results in an inmate’s 
delay, however, would be counted against the state in assessing a Lackey claim. 
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new lethal injection procedure, so the state was unable to seek any executions 
in 2011.215 
Finally, as one last safeguard to assure relief to inmates deserving a com-
mutation to a life sentence, I propose including a safety valve that enables 
courts to grant relief to a petitioner whose leading cause of delay is not 
negligence or deliberate action by the state. This procedure would be used, 
for example, in a circumstance where the petitioner’s legitimate exercise of 
his right to review is the leading cause of delay, but state misconduct also 
played a substantial role or was particularly egregious. This very narrow 
carve-out would permit courts to grant relief based on equitable principles, 
and—in keeping with the Court’s consideration of equitable principles—
would only be used sparingly.216 
CONCLUSION 
Just as the process of consummating a death sentence is fraught with 
complicated issues that lead to numerous delays, so the Lackey claim itself is 
inextricably bound up with difficult procedural and policy questions. 
Because the Court remains unwilling to confront this issue head on, it is 
critical that states seek alternative solutions to the problems posed by 
inordinate death row delays. States must take action to address the concerns 
related to the Lackey claim. But they have many options for doing so, 
whether by reforming the prison system or their postconviction-relief 
processes, or even by eliminating capital punishment altogether. By using 
Justice Stevens’s framework as a model for crafting legislation to address 
the growing problem of death row delays, it is possible, at long last, to 
balance the competing concerns surrounding the Lackey claim and to 
provide a workable solution for both states and inmates. 
 
215 See Carol J. Williams, State Won’t Execute Anyone in 2011, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2011, at A1 
(“The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation requested more time because San 
Quentin State Prison’s new warden, Michael Martel, wants to recruit a new execution team to 
replace the one that was assembled and trained last year . . . .”). 
216 See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (“Federal courts have typi-
cally extended equitable relief only sparingly.”). Kate McMahon has also recommended legislation 
to address the problems that arise from the “death row syndrome”; in addition to the proposals 
outlined in this paper, I recommend following McMahon’s suggestion that legislation support 
appropriate alternatives, such as clemency. See McMahon, supra note 76, at 74-75 (“[L]egislation 
should nonetheless continue to provide a clemency appeal option for that very narrow set of cases 
that might be able to benefit from it, but it should not presume that clemency adequate [sic] 
fulfills the function that an Eighth Amendment inordinate delay challenge does.”). 
